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STANDING UP TO WALL STREET
(AND CONGRESS)
Richard W. Painter*

TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE
AMERICA DON'T WANT You TO KNOW, WHAT You CAN Do TO
FIGHT BACK. By Arthur Levitt. New York: Pantheon Books. 2002. Pp.
x, 338. $24.95.
In 1992, Arthur Levitt co-chaired a fundraising dinner for William
Clinton. The dinner raised $750,000 (p. 7). Clinton was elected
President, and Levitt got the job he wanted: Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Levitt, a former Chairman of
the American Stock Exchange and a connected Democrat, was well
qualified for the job. His, however, became a pyrrhic victory when
accountants, issuers, broker-dealers, and other special interests used
their own political connections to frustrate just about everything he
sought to do.
Levitt tells the story of his struggle against these well-funded inter
ests in Take on the Street. One of his most troubling revelations is how
little independence the Commission, a purportedly independent
agency, 1 actually has in the face of political pressure from Congress.
Combine that pressure with Congress's dependence on campaign
contributions from industries regulated by the Commission and the
recipe for regulatory capture is complete.
Levitt is right that investors are not represented as an interest
group on Capital Hill.2 Lack of investor representation, coupled with
Congress's willingness to interfere with the work of the Commission,
required Levitt to pick his battles carefully, and it is not always evident
that he did so. Hindsight now provides Levitt with an opportunity to
identify areas in which, despite the treacherous political waters of the
1990s, he could have been more effective in protecting investors.
Rarely, however, does the book reassess Levitt's own priorities or

*
Guy Raymond and Mildred van Voorhis Jones Professor of Law, University of
Illinois. B.A 1984, Harvard; J.D. 1 987, Yale. - Ed. The author wishes to thank Peter
Prommer for research assistance in connection with this Book Review.

1. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2000) (including the Commission in the definition of "inde
pendent regulatory agencies").
2. P. 237 (stating that investors are "the most overlooked and underrepresented interest
group in America").
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approach. Instead, it concentrates on explaining why he pursued the
regulatory agenda that he did.
Levitt's emphasis on self-justification is one of the book's
weaknesses. Nonetheless, he gives investors helpful advice in plain
English on everything from mutual funds to stock brokers and reading
financial statements, in separate chapters devoted to each of these
topics. Perhaps most importantly, Levitt also explains how he was so
often frustrated in doing his job. Although academic work on regula
tory capture theory is abundant,3 a behind-the-scene account of how
capture actually takes place is rare. An account as good as this one
(complete with an Appendix publishing irate letters that Levitt
received from members of Congress on behalf of the accounting
industry) is a valuable contribution to the study of how regulatory
agencies function in a political system influenced by the voice of
regulated industries.
TAKING ON THE AUDITORS
In Chapter Five, Levitt discusses shortcomings he sees in the
auditing profession. Chief among these are conflicts of interest when
firms perform nonaudit services for audit clients. Levitt believes that
nonaudit engagements, which sometimes generate fees several times
higher than audit fees from the same clients, undermine auditors'
independence from clients.4 Some of these engagements also involve
work (such as bookkeeping) that will later be reviewed in the audit,
posing another conflict of interest.5
Levitt's view on these conflicts may be correct, although arguments
in favor of nonaudit engagements are not explored, or adequately
refuted, in his book. Audit firms are hardly independent to begin with,
as audit fees are alone substantial and audit partners are often paid

3. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A McCahery, Regulatory Competition,
Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV 1861 (1995). For gen
eral discussion of the theory of regulatory capture, see George Stigler, The Theory of Eco
nomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971), and Sam Peltzman, Toward a
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
.

4. P. 138 (citing Dow Jones Newswire report that companies making up the S&P 500
paid their auditors $3.7 billion for nonaudit services in 2000, more than three times the $1.2
billion in audit fees paid by these same companies that year). In the case of some individual
companies, the disparity between fees for audit and nonaudit services was much larger.
Sprint Corp., for example, apparently paid Ernst & Young only $2.5 million for its audit and
$64 million for consulting and other services. P. 138. "I have to wonder if any individual
auditor, working on a $2.5 million audit contract, would have the guts to stand up to a CFO
and question a dubious number in the books, thus possibly jeopardizing $64 million in busi
ness for the firm's consultants." P. 138.
5. "If an accountant keeps the books for a client, he can't turn around and vouch for the
accuracy and completeness of those books." P. 118.
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based on audit clients they bring in and keep.6 Issuers' managers
in tum have substantial influence over hiring and firing auditors,
particularly before Congress turned this function over to issuers' audit
committees in 2002.7 Thus, the relevant inquiry is how much additional
perverse incentive is created when fees from nonaudit services are
added to the mix. The answer is not clear. Neither is it clear whether
this added incentive for auditor malfeasance is outweighed by positive
contributions to audit quality from having nonaudit services per
formed for the issuer by the audit firm.
Nonaudit engagements arguably could improve audit quality. First,
there is informational ·advantage enjoyed by multidisciplinary audit
firms. Providing nonaudit services, particularly legal and tax services,
could help an audit firm see how a client puts together complex trans
actions. Assuming the auditor has not erected a communication
barrier or "firewall" between its audit and nonaudit functions,
problems initially detected by nonauditors could be brought to the
attention of auditors.8 The fact that auditors have broader disclosure
obligations than other professionals, particularly lawyers, might
increase the chances of public disclosure.9
Second, the auditor providing nonaudit services could be held to a
higher legal standard of care because it should know more about a
client than an auditor that provides only audit services.10 Indeed,
plaintiffs also could point to fees for nonaudit services as evidence of
an additional motive for an auditor to misrepresent an issuer's finan
cial statements.''

6. See Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeane Dugan, Sad Account: Andersen's Fall from Grace ls a
Tale of Greed and Misrnes, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2002 at Al; Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting
Firms Face Backlash over the Tax Shelters They Sold, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2003, at A6.
7. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 202 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending§ lOA(m) of the Exchange Act to provide that
audit committees shall be responsible for retention, compensation, and oversight of outside
auditors); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78 (2000) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.§§ 78a-78mm) (2002)).
8. See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of
Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399, 1426-36 (2000) (discussing informational synergies
from multidisciplinary practice that could improve audit quality).
9. id. at 1430.
10. The auditor thus might have more difficulty proving a due-diligence defense under§
1 1 of the Securities Act or disproving a claim of recklessness under§ lO(b) of the Exchange
Act.
1 1 . Pleading specific facts that infer a defendant's motive to deceive is critical to surviv
ing a motion to dismiss fraud claims under§ lO(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(2000), and§ 21 D(b) of the Exchange Act, 1 5 U.S.C.§ 78u3 (requirement for pleading state
of mind). See ln re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring
"strong inference" of scienter through either (1) facts establishing a motive and opportunity
to commit fraud; or (2) facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or con
scious behavior).
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Definitive resolution of the debate over nonaudit services thus
requires answers to difficult questions that Levitt does not address:
How much do nonaudit engagements increase the likelihood that
auditors will cut corners to please lucrative clients, and are these per
verse incentives outweighed by benefits to audit quality from nonaudit
engagements?12 Levitt points out that many failed audits in recent
years involved clients that obtained nonaudit services from their audi
tors (pp. 138-39). His anecdotal evidence, however, comes from a rela
tively small sample of less than a dozen firms. This hardly proves cause
and effect. The case that nonaudit services are a serious threat to audit
quality should be more rigorously tested by statistical comparison
of audits by audit-only firms with audits by firms that also provide
nonaudit services to the same issuer. A statistically significant
difference in incidents of earnings restatements or other problems
with audits between these two groups would provide firmer support
for Levitt's intuitively appealing argument against allowing audit firms
to provide nonaudit services for audit clientsY
The Commission required issuers to publicly disclose nonaudit fees
paid in proxy statements filed after February 5, 2001, and several em
pirical studies use this newly public information to measure the impact
of nonaudit fees on audit quality. Results of these studies, however,
are inconclusive. One 2001 study found significant negative market
reaction to proxy statements filed by issuers reporting higher than
expected nonaudit fees, a measure perhaps of what the market thinks
of audit quality.14 The study also found some evidence that issuers that

12. In addition to the ways in which nonaudit services could improve audit quality, there
arguably are economies of scale and synergies that could be realized when issuers obtain
audit and nonaudit services from one provider. For example, time spent by both auditors
and nonaudit service providers familiarizing themselves with a client's business and
management could be reduced when audits and other services are provided by the same
firm. To the extent such cost savings are passed on to investors, they too are relevant to the
question of whether auditor provision of nonaudit services helps or harms investors.
13. This author is aware of only one such study that looks for a correlation between
earnings restatements and nonaudit services. This is also the only study that this author is
aware of that examines "confidential" data from the time period prior to 2000 (data
concerning nonaudit fees for the period after 2000 is publicly available). See William R. Kin
ney, Jr. et al., Auditor Independence and Non-audit services: What do Restatements Sug
gest? (May 14, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (using detailed fee data
- obtained by the study's authors after negotiating a confidentiality agreement with the
seven largest auditing firms in the United States - on 432 registrants that announced re
statements from 1995-2000 and 512 similar registrants without restatements). This study
found little evidence of positive association between issuer restatements and audit-firm fees
for either financial-information systems or internal-audit services. However, the study found
some evidence of positive correlation between "other" services fees and restatements, ex
cept for a negative correlation between tax services and restatements. By contrast, most em
pirical studies in this area look for a correlation between nonaudit services and an indicator
of audit quality other than restatements. See studies cited infra notes 14-17.
14.

M. FRANKEL ET AL., AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AND EARNINGS
(Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1696R, July 2001).

RICHARD
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bought more nonaudit services from their auditors were more likely
to engage in earnings management, a practice which is difficult to
measure but that can be approximated by examining how often an
issuer just meets or beats earnings benchmarks or reports large
income-increasing or income-decreasing discretionary accruals.15
Other studies, however, show no effect of nonaudit fees on other
measures of audit quality, such as the willingness of the auditor to
send a "going concern" opinion letter to an issuer that questions the
issuer's ability to stay in business.16 Absent more empirical evidence
confirming Levitt's concern about nonaudit fees, it is not at all certain
that his enormous battle with the accounting industry over this issue
was a worthwhile expenditure of political capital (p. 138).
Furthermore, Levitt does not discuss other approaches that might
be more effective in improving audit quality. For example, the SEC
could have allowed auditors to provide nonaudit services to audit
clients, but only on the condition that (i) auditors communicate on a
regular basis with employees performing nonaudit services for the
same client; (ii) all information known to nonaudit employees in the
audit firm be imputed to the auditors for purposes of civil and criminal
liability; (iii) the audit firm rotates the audit partner with principal
responsibility for each client's account;1 7 and (iv) perhaps most impor1 5. Id. But see Hollis Ashbaugh et al., Do Non-Audit Services Compromise Auditor
Independence? Further Evidence (Apr. 18, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (finding no such correlation between issuers' positive discretionary accruals and the
ratio of audit to nonaudit fees in a study that controlled for the issuers' prior performance, a
factor that can itself be related to income increasing accruals); J. Kenneth Reynolds et al.,
Professional Service Fees and Auditor Objectivity (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (observing that the correlation between aggregate levels of discretionary accru
als and the ratio of consulting fees to audit fees disappears when controlling for high-growth
issuers). Other studies also have not detected a relationship between audit firms' fees and
evidence of earnings management. See, e.g., Hyeesoo Chung & Sanjay Kallapur, Client
Importance, Non-Audit Services, and Abnormal Accruals (Aug. 2002) (unpublished manu
script, on file with author) (finding no statistically significant association between abnormal
accruals by issuers and "client importance" measures such as the ratio of both audit and
nonaudit fees to the audit firm's total U.S. revenues or to the revenues of a particular office
of the audit firm).
1 6. See, e.g., Mark L. Defond et al., Do Non-Audit Service Fees Impair Auditor
Independence? Evidence from Going Concern Audit Opinions, 40 J. ACCT. R ES 1243 (2002)
(finding no significant correlation between the auditor's willingness to issue a going concern
opinion with respect to an issuer and either total fees or audit fees paid by the issuer to its
audit firm). The results of this study could be harmonized with those of FRANKEL ET AL.,
supra note 14, by hypothesizing that auditors are induced by nonaudit fees to cut small cor
ners for issuers, as shown by earnings management strategies, but that nonaudit fees will not
discourage an auditor from acting appropriately to address a serious problem, such as issuer
insolvency, in which the auditor's own liability is significantly enhanced.
.

17. This condition is now imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 203, amending
§ lOA of the Exchange Act. The Act also orders a study to be conducted as to whether audit
firm rotation should also be required. See§ 207. At least one empirical study, however, has
found that the size of an issuer's earnings accruals is inversely related to the length of the
auditor-client relationship. This would suggest that mandatory auditor rotation could actu
ally harm audit quality. See James Myers et al., Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client
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tant, that the audit committee of an issuer rather than the issuer's
senior management be responsible for hiring and firing the auditor.18
Such approaches might have increased the likelihood that information
gained from nonaudit services actually informed the audit.
Whatever the merits of his position on nonaudit engagements,
Levitt is right that the way in which the accountants fought their battle
with the Commission over this issue raises questions about the
Commission's ability to preserve its own independence from the
industries it regulates. The barrage of letters that Levitt received from
Members of Congress urging him to back off on auditor independence
(and the similar letter from Kenneth Lay, the CEO of Enron, praising
nonaudit and audit services performed by Arthur Andersen)19 is
deeply troubling. Here, in the Appendix to Levitt's book, one sees the
power of Congress being brought to bear on a purportedly independ
ent agency, as well as Congress's eagerness to respond to demands
that regulated industries make on the political process.20
TAKING ON THE ANALYSTS
Conflicts of interest affecting stock market research were obvious
by the time Levitt became Chairman of the Commission in 1993.21
After fixed commissions were abolished in 1975 and the profitability
of brokerage operations declined, broker-dealers earned lower returns
on reputational capital tied to research and recommendations in
stocks.22 The enormous profitability of underwriting and trading
operations in the 1990s, on the other hand, encouraged broker-dealers
to sacrifice their reputation on the research side if necessary to attract
investment banking business and to favor their own traders over bro
kerage customers. In some instances, this is exactly what happened.23

Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? (June
2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
1 8 . This condition is also now imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201,
amending § lOA of the Exchange Act.
19. See Appendix at 299-300 (letter dated September 20, 2000 from Kenneth L. Lay,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Enron Corporation to Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
Securities Exchange Commission (stating that "for the past several years, Enron has success
fully utilized its independent audit firm's expertise and professional skepticism to help im
prove the overall control environment within the company")).
20. These aspects of the capture problem are discussed more extensively under the
heading "Taking on Congress" in this Review.
21. "The problem was apparent as far back as the 1960s." P. 69.
22. "During the past two decades, the economics of Wall Street had shifted away from
retail sales to arranging initial public offerings, which brought in billions of dollars of profit
during the runaway bull market." P. 65.
23. See p. 66.
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During the bull market of the 1990s, analysts' buy recommenda
tions not surprisingly outnumbered sell recommendations by huge
proportions.24 Investment-banking clients were almost never down
graded, even if the firm's trading desk knew, perhaps from confiden
tial emails from analysts, that the stock was to be avoided.25 Industry
relationships reinforced this behavior because issuers had substantial
influence over their investment bankers, who they could always
replace with a competitor, and investment bankers in turn had sub
stantial influence over the work of analysts in their firms, even how
much analysts got paid.
Rather than addressing these structural problems that encouraged
analysts to mislead investors, however, the Commission focused most
of its efforts on a related problem: analysts' informational advantage
over ordinary investors from private communications with issuers. The
Commission sought in Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Regulation
FD")26 to prevent analysts from receiving preferential access to
nonpublic information from issuers, and thus to prevent analysts' firms
from trading on that information or allowing favored customers to
trade on that information, before it is disseminated to the public.27
Such access to inside information creates yet one more incentive for
analysts to shade their reports in order to preserve their relationship
with issuer management.28 Removing analysts' informational advan
tage, however, does not remove other incentives (such as investment
banking business) that analysts and their firms have to shade reports
to please issuer management. Regulation FD was thus only a partial
answer to misleading analysts' recommendations.
It was with Regulation FD that the Commission, despite its well
intentioned effort to even the playing field between analysts and ordi
nary investors, may have had the wrong priorities. Analysts' privileged
access to inside information was a problem. A still greater problem,
however, was that information given to investors by some analysts,
even absent inside information, was wrong, and probably intentionally
so. It was the misinformation given by analysts to investors that fed
the market bubble of the late 1990s, not the fact that investors did not

24. See p. 73 (reporting that in March 2000, there were ninety-two buy recommenda
tions for every sell recommendation).
25. P. 65 (discussing investigation in which New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
subpoenaed internal emails from analysts at Merrill Lynch that had described stock recom
mended by these analysts as "a piece of junk," "crap," and "a dog").
26. 1 7 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103 (2001).
27. "Mutual funds and pension funds were getting far better information, and a lot
earlier, than retail investors." P. 8.
28. Some issuer CEO's and finance chiefs "were trading important information about
earnings and product development· with selected analysts, who in return were writing
glowing reports." P. 8
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get information soon enough. Combating this misinformation should
have been the Commission's priority.
There is also at least some evidence that Regulation FD delays
rather than accelerates dissemination of information to markets by
encouraging issuers to delay communication with analysts until they
are willing to make a public announcement.29 Regulation FD, on the
other hand, seems fair because it requires issuers to let their own
shareholders know information at the same time they tell analysts.
Because fairness is important to investor confidence, Regulation FD
may have been justified despite its costs. Nonetheless, the
Commission, in pushing this controversial Rule, spent political capital
that could have been spent addressing structural problems that
induced some analysts to lie to investors in research reports even when
they did not possess material nonpublic information about an issuer.
Although Levitt sought to address these structural problems by
pressuring the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")
to strengthen ethics rules for analysts, he did so late in the his term,
after the market bubble had already begun to burst.30 The SEC talked
about the possibility of regulating analysts if the NASD would not,31
but the SEC did not propose rules of its own. Not until passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did federal regulation address analysts'
conflicts of interest.32 Moreover, the SEC never required brokerage
firms to disclose this problem to ordinary investors, for example, by
disclosing that analysts' reports are "sales literature,"33 something that
29. See, e.g., Richard M. Frankel et al., An Empirical Investigation of Pre-Earnings An
nouncement Quiet Periods (Feb. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (ob
serving a substantial increase in the number of issuer self-imposed "quiet periods" after
Regulation FD; that quiet-period issuers have characteristics indicative of higher litigation
risk; and that trading volume in these issuers' stocks is higher before earnings
announcements, but lower afterwards).
30. P. 67 (describing December 2000 phone call from NASD President Mary Schapiro
informing Levitt that the NASD's members could not agree on a new code of conduct for
securities analysts that Levitt had fourteen months earlier asked the NASD to come up
with).
3 1 . P. 67 (reporting that Levitt, in the December 2000 phone call with Schapiro, insisted
that the NASD regulate and threatened, "If you don't do it, we will.").
32. Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 added§ 15D of the Exchange Act,
which requires the Commission to promulgate rules designed to address conflicts of interest
in securities analysts' reports within one year of the Act's passage. These rules must, among
other things, restrict the involvement of investment-banking employees of the
broker-dealer in approval of research reports, 'supervising or compensating analysts, as well
as prohibit the broker-dealer from retaliating against an analyst as a result of recommenda
tions. See 15 U.S.C.§ 15D(a). The Commission is also required to promulgate rules requir
ing securities analysts to disclose in public appearances and in research reports their own
conflicts of interest. See§ 15D(b).
33. See Robert P. Sieland, Note, Caveat Emptor! After All the Regulatory Hoopla, Secu
rities Analysts Remain Conflicted on Wall Street, �003 U. ILL. L. REV. 531 (recognizing that
conflicts of interest persist for securities analysts even after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
proposing that all analysts' reports generated within broker-dealers be labeled "sales litera
ture" to alert investors to these conflicts).
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sophisticated investors already knew.34 In hindsight, the Commission
should have directed the same energy that it spent battling broke�
dealers over Regulation FD toward an initiative early in Levitt's term
to curtail the misleadingly optimistic analysts' reports that Levitt knew
all along were a factor in the market's unrealistic valuation of equities
in the 1990s (p. 71).
TAKING ON THE LA WYERS

Levitt's book also omits an important issue in the debate over the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: corporate lawyers who knowingly assist
clients with defrauding investors or at a minimum look the other way
when clients commit fraud.35 The last time the Commission sought to
define standards of professional responsibility for securities lawyers
through disciplinary proceedings was in 1981.36 The Commission soon
thereafter made a point of reassuring lawyers that it would not again
seek to impose sanctions on lawyers absent judicial or bar association
findings of violations.37 The Commission under Levitt continued what
it had been doing about securities lawyers' ethics since the early 1980s:
nothing.
A few commentators urged Levitt's Commission to clarify its
stance on lawyer disclosure of corporate fraud, asking for an imposi
tion of an up-the-ladder reporting requirement requiring lawyers to
communicate with client boards of directors about securities law viola
tions.38 The Commission, however, continued to stay away from
lawyers. Finally, after the Enron and Worldcom fiascoes, forty law
professors wrote Levitt's successor Harvey Pitt in March 2002 seeking
34. Pp. 74-77 (subchapter titled "Everybody Knew- Except You").
35. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act,§ 307 and legislative history of§ 307 discussed in text ac
companying notes 38-41, infra.
36. See In re William R. Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17597, 22 SEC Docket
No. 292 (Feb. 28, 1981), 1981 WL 384414.
37. See Edward F. Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Remarks to the New York County Lawyers' Association, January.
18, 1982, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. ·Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), '![ 83,089 (Jan. 18, 1982)
(statement by SEC General Counsel Greene that in his view the SEC should not institute
proceedings against lawyers under Rule 102(e), absent a prior judicial finding of a
securities law violation); Securities Act Release No. 6783, 1988 WL 278442, at 24631 (July
13, 1988) (reaffirming that Rule 102(e) charges should not be brought absent prior determi
nation by a court or bar association that the attorney's conduct was unethical or a violation
of securities laws).
38. See Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate
Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225 (1996) [hereinafter Painter &
Duggan, Corporate Fraud] (proposing SEC rules, or alternatively an amendment to the Ex
change Act, requiring up-the-ladder reporting by issuer's counsel either to the issuer's full
board of directors or to a committee of the issuer's board designated by the issuer in ad
vance); see also Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 719
(2001).
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a Commission rule requiring issuers' lawyers to report unrectified se
curities law violations to client boards of directors.39 The Commission
responded by acknowledging strong opposition from within the
organized bar to Commission regulation of lawyers and by suggesting
that Congress could step into this arena if it wanted.4° Congress took
up this invitation in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and mandated
that the Commission promulgate professional responsibility rules for
lawyers representing issuers before the Commission, including the up
the-ladder reporting requirement.41 The Commission promulgated its
rules in January 2003,42 but even these rules were watered down from
the Commission's November 2002 proposals that had drawn the pre
dictable ire of lawyers subject to those rules.43
Although these legislative and rulemaking initiatives began after
publication of Levitt's book, lawyers' professional responsibility
was an important issue before and during Levitt's tenure at the
Commission.44 The Commission's role in regulating securities lawyers,
however, goes unmentioned in his book. The Commission's failure for
over two decades to assure the integrity of the lawyers who practice
before it was an example of how, even without interference from
Congress, the Commission could quickly back down in the face of
pressure from an interest group that it had, briefly in the late 1970s,
sought to regulate. Indeed, in this instance it was Congress, in the sea
change of political opinion after the Enron and Worldcom scandals,
that stood up to the ABA and other bar associations and told the
Commission that lawyer regulation was required.
As Chairman of the Commission, however, Levitt did address
lawyers' ethics in one important area (also not mentioned in his book):
"pay to play" arrangements in which municipal bond lawyers or
39. Letter from Richard W. Painter et al., to Harvey Pitt, Chairman, Securities and
Exchange Commission (Mar. 7, 2002) (on file with author).
40. Letter from David M. Becker, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commis
sion, to Richard W. Painter (Mar. 28, 2002) (on file with author) (citing Painter & Duggan,
Corporate Fraud, supra note 38, for the proposition that Congress rather than the Commis
sion should take the first step toward federal regulation of securities lawyers).
41. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act,§ 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
42. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205, 240 and 249, adopted in Release No. 33-8185; 34-47276. For the
Commission's proposed Rules, see Release No. 33-8186; 34-47282, available at http://www.
sec.gov, proposing 17 C.F.R Parts 205, 240 and 249.
43. See http://www.sec.gov (containing several dozen comment letters from around the
world, mostly from securities lawyers and bar associations, on the Commission's proposed
rules under§ 307). The Commission in its final rules responded to these comment letters by
narrowing many of the definitions in the proposed rules. The Commission, for example,
more narrowly defined which lawyers "practice before the Commission" and are thereby
covered by the rules, and the definition of what constitutes "evidence of a material viola
tion" sufficient to trigger lawyer reporting obligations.
44. See Painter & Duggan, Corporate Fraud, supra note 38; Jn re William R. Carter, Ex
change Act Release No. 34-17597, 22 SEC Docket No. 292 (Feb. 28, 1981), 1981 WL 384414.

1522

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1512

plaintiffs' lawyers make campaign contributions to state officials and
are then appointed as counsel for state bond underwritings or for state
pension funds having the lead plaintiffs' role in securities class action
suits.45 The Commission should perhaps have followed through by
discouraging municipal-bond issuers from retaining bond counsel that
made campaign contributions, and by filing amicus briefs in class
actions asking courts to disqualify counsel who had made campaign
contributions to state officials who manage the pension funds serving
as lead plaintiff. The ABA, however, fought the SEC on this issue,
and, unfortunately, the SEC did not stand its ground.46 The ABA was
allowed to substitute its own rule that is highly subjective and
unenforceable.47
TAKING ON MANAGEMENT
Accountants, broker-dealers, lawyers, and other gatekeepers could
have done more to prevent financial fraud during the 1990s, but
managers at issuer corporations were usually the primary culprits.
Compensation tied to stock price may have given managers more in
centives to commit fraud, and directors may have provided inadequate
oversight of managers' activities. Although state corporation law, not
federal securities law, governs compensation of managers and govern
ance of corporations, it would be interesting to hear Levitt's view of
whether state corporate law failed, and if so, what should be done
about it.
One of Levitt's predecessors as Chairman of the Commission,
William Cary, believed strongly that state corporate law in the 1960s
and 1970s was racing to the bottom from investors' vantage point, and
Cary initiated an important academic debate with his proposal for
federalization of corporate law.48 Levitt could have revived this debate
by specifically pointing out which areas of corporate law, if any, he
45. See Arthur Levitt, Lawyers and Ethics: The Problem of Pay-to-Play, Remarks at the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Fixed Income Daily Conference on Municipal
Finance (June 26, 1 997), available at 1997 WL 353221 (S.E.C.); Michael Stanton, Levitt Says
SEC May Act if Lawyers, Issuers Don't Curb Pay to Play, BOND BUYER, Apr. 18, 1996, at 3.
46. See generally Jon B. Jordan, The Regulation of "Pay-to-Play" and the Influence of
Political Contributions in the Municipal Securities Industry, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. RE V. 489
(describing Levitt's confrontation with the ABA and other bar associations over this issue).
47. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.6 (2003) (providing that "[a] lawyer or
law firm shall not accept a government legal engagement or an appointment by a j udge if
the lawyer or law firm makes a political contribution or solicits political contributions for
the purpose of obtaining or being considered for that type of legal engagement or
appointment").
48. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
L.J. 663, 666 (1974). But see Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. L EGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (arguing that Delaware
corporate law maximizes rather than minimizes shareholder welfare).
YALE
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believed should be subject to federal regulation. For the most part,
Levitt does not engage this topic, even though as his book was going
to press, Congress was enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the
broadest federal encroachment into corporate governance in decades.
One very significant issue is management compensation. Stock
options and other compensation packages that tie managers' pay to
stock prices gave managers more incentive than they already had to
conceal earnings shortfalls and other problems in order to temporarily
inflate issuer stock prices. Nonetheless, stock options and manager
compensation were for the most part untouched by the Sarbanes
Oxley Act.49 Levitt points out instances where shareholders object
because too many stock options are granted or options are exercisable
at ridiculously low' prices (pp. 212-13, 218-19), and the Commission is
now deliberating over proposals from the stock exchanges that would
require shareholder approval of employee stock options.50 Meanwhile,
the Financial Accounting Standards Board is still deliberating over
whether issuers should be required to treat stock options as an
expense at the time they are granted,51 an issue about which the
Commission did little during Levitt's tenure.52
Implicit in these debates is the assumption that issuers should grant
their executives stock options in the first place. Perhaps options are
desirable because the incentive they give managers to enhance corpo
rate performance outweighs the incentive options give managers to
overcompensate themselves and to lie about performance. While this
may be true, it is not obvious. Readers would have benefited from
hearing Levitt's view on whether options should be used at all, and
whether the Commission, the stock exchanges, state corporate law, or
issuers themselves should decide when options are to be granted, and
how they are to be accounted for.
By contrast, the oversight functions of corporate boards, and
particularly audit committees, are extensively regulated in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.53 It is here that the Act intrudes most broadly
49. The Act does, however, provide that an issuer's chief executive officer and chief fi
nancial officer must forfeit bonuses and profits from trades in securities of the issuer during
periods in which the issuer is required to restate its earnings "as a result of misconduct."
Sarbanes-Oxley Act§ 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2002).
50. Gretchen Morgenson, Plan Restricting Stock Options Stalls at S.E.C.,
Mar. 13, 2003, at Al.

N.Y. TIMES,

51. See, Arden Dale, Accounting Body to Consider Classification of Stock Options,
J., Mar. 13, 2003, at C9 (reporting that the Financial Accounting Standards Board
voted to add to its agenda the issue of whether to require companies to count employee
stock options as a compensation expense).
WALL ST.

52. See pp. 107-11 (discussing Levitt's caving in to pressure from Congress and refusing
to back up FASB on its proposed rule that would require issuers to account for options as an
expense when granted).
53. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, amending § lOA of the Exchange Act, to add
subsection (m) requiring the Commission to direct the national securities exchanges to pro-
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into matters traditionally governed under state corporate law,
triggering debate over whether this intrusion was really necessary,54
and if so, whether it went far enough. Levitt discusses corporate audit
committees' lack of independence in Chapter Eight of his book, as
well as his own partially successful effort as Chairman to persuade the
stock exchanges to reform audit committees.55 Such initiatives,
however, pale in comparison to the sweeping regulation in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and it would be helpful to know if Levitt believes
federal legislation of corporate governance was required, or whether
his more conservative approach of working through the stock
exchanges ultimately would have been successful.
TAKING ON THE LITIGATION SYSTEM
Although the Commission has long viewed private rights of action
as a necessary supplement to its own enforcement powers, Levitt led a
lukewarm effort to fight retrenchment of private plaintiffs' rights in
two rounds of amendments to the securities laws in 1995 and 1998.
Levitt's book barely mentions this important legislation, thus side
stepping a major issue in the debate over investor protection in the
1990s.
Even if Levitt had taken a more aggressive stance against legisla
tive retrenchment of civil litigation, his task would have been made
difficult by Congress's hostility to plaintiffs and the poor public image
of the plaintiffs' bar. One prominent class action lawyer publicly stated
that he "has no clients,"56 reinforcing defendants' arguments that class
action litigation enriched lawyers more than it protected investors.
Plaintiffs' lawyers contributed to their political allies, mostly
Democrats, but could not match the political contributions of defen
dants who carefully nurtured relationships in both parties. Plaintiffs'

hibit listing of securities of any issuer that does not meet requirements specified in that sub
section (m) concerning membership on directors' audit committees, duties of audit
committees, and audit committee procedures for, among other things, receiving anonymous
information from employees of the issuer and engaging independent counsel.
54. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the
Rent on U.S. Law, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act went too far, particularly in its interference with corporate governance norms that tradi
tionally vary depending on the state or country of incorporation); Larry E. Ribstein, Market
vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2003).
55. See pp. 204-35 (chapter entitled "Corporate Governance and the Culture of
Seduction" discussing shortcomings in corporate governance and more specifically of the
SEC's efforts to integrate audit committee reform into stock exchange listing requirements).
56. William P. Barrett, I Have No Clients, FORBES, Oct. 1 1 , 1993, at 52 (quoting William
S. Lerach (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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lawyers thus lost their legislative battles in 1995 and 1998, and the
debate continues over whether investors lost as well.57
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")
changed private securities litigation more than any statute since the
1930s. The 1995 Act imposed new procedural hurdles, including
heightened pleading standards and a stay on discovery pending resolu
tion of a defendant's motion to dismiss. The 1995 Act also included a
"safe harbor" against fraud claims for forward-looking statements, as
well as new, pro-defendant formulas for calculating damages. Defen
dants other than the issuers (such as auditors) in most cases were
made only liable for a portion of the shareholders' damages according
to a proportionate-liability formula linked to a defendant's share of
blame for the violation.58 The combined effect of all of these provi
sions was to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to win securities fraud
suits and, when plaintiffs do win, to reduce liability. Whatever the
merits of this legislation, particularly in cutting back on frivolous suits,
it may have reduced the deterrent effect of civil litigation by reducing
the expected cost of violating securities laws.
In retrospect, someone needed to speak out on Capitol Hill, not
for defendants or for plaintiffs' lawyers, but for investors. Levitt tried
to do so,59 and the Commission micromanaged some important
compromises concerning the wording of the 1995 Act.60 The Commis
sion did not, however, propose a clear alternative agenda that priori
tized investors over lawyers and defendants. For example, the
57. Many scholars believed that the 1995 Reform Act made litigation on behalf of
plaintiffs too difficult. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. L. 975, 995 (1 996)
(the 1995 Reform Act favors defendants "at virtually every juncture."); Joel Seligman, The
Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1996); Lynn A. Stout, Type I
Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711
(1996). Others were concerned that the PSLRA had not gone far enough, and that litigation
was merely shifting to state courts. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The
Pentium Papers: A Case Study of Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (1996).
58. These provisions are incorporated in Securities Act § 27 (Private Securities
Litigation) and§ 27 A (Application of Safe Harbor for Forward Looking Statements), and in
Exchange Act, § 21D (Private Securities Litigation) and § 21 E (Application of Safe Harbor
for Forward Looking Statements).
59. P. 13 ("The vast and growing number of individual investors, however, lacked focus,
direction, or leadership to make much of an impression on Washington policy makers. I
often wondered how to empower this expanding group . . . . ).
"

60. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform Proposals: Hearings on S. 240, S. 667, and H.R.
1058 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 247, 249 (1995) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman. U.S
Securities and Exchange Commission) (expressing Levitt's concern that the Senate Bill
contained language setting forth a pleading standard that was too high, and that the Act
failed to define the standard of recklessness sufficient to sustain an action under § lO(b) of
the Exchange Act); Id. at 231, 235-36 (stating that Chairman Levitt favored the
Second Circuit's pleading standard for scienter). The Commission was also very much
involved with Congress's drafting of the Act's safe harbor for forward looking statements.
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Commission could have strongly endorsed reforms that curtailed pro
cedural and ethical abuses by plaintiffs' lawyers without curtailing
substantive rights of plaintiffs themselves. The F.R.C.P. Rule 11 provi
sions of the 1995 Act its limitations on excessive counsel fees, its
settlement disclosure requirements, and its lead counsel provisions all should have received strong Commission support at th.e outset.61
Changes to pleading, discovery, and damages formulas, including
the Act's proportionate liability scheme, were more problematic in
that they directly obstructed plaintiffs' remedies and thus decreased
the expected penalty for fraud.62 Arguably, the proportionate liability
scheme encouraged auditors and other collateral participants to worry
less about fraud liability, with adverse consequences in Enron and
other matters.63 Also, perhaps the <;::ommission should have insisted
that it, not Congress and the various lobbyists influencing Congress,
design the safe harbor for .forward looking statements. Finally,
although the Commission was given some additional enforcement
powers in the 1995 Act,64 the Commission should have insisted on
more extensive enforcement powers and a more adequate budget, in
return for Commission endorsement of the 1995 Act.
The Commission instead appears to have spent much of its energy
reacting to initiatives in Congress. With nobody making a clear case
that investor protection is different from lawyer protection, the battle
over the 1995 Act was easy to portray as one between plaintiffs'
lawyers and defendants,65 neither of whom could claim the moral high
61. Other provisions of the 1995 Act targeted at abuses by plaintiffs' lawyers include
those barring the use of repeat "professional plaintiffs"; barring lawyers from giving finan
cial incentives to lead plaintiffs; prohibiting sealed settlements that conceal attorneys' fees
and other information about a settlement; and barring attorneys from receiving a dispropor
tionate share of settlement awards. It can always be argued that measures designed to curb
plaintiffs' lawyers ultimately hurt plaintiffs by discouraging lawyers from filing suits. Perhaps
at the margins this is true, but regulation of lawyer conduct generally deters the least merito
rious suits and encourages lawyers to share a more significant percentage of damage awards
with investors. Compared with measures that directly impair plaintiffs' procedural and
substantive legal rights, regulation of lawyer conduct should cure abuses in class action litiga
tion at lower cost to investors.
62. See Securities Act§ 27 and Exchange Act§ 21 D (containing these provisions).
63. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "Its About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,"
57 Bus. L. 1403, 1410 (2002) (stating that "the new standard of proportionate liability pro
tected (auditors] far more than it did most corporate defendants" and that "although audi
tors are still sued today, the settlement value of cases against auditors has gone way down").
On the other hand, Arthur Andersen's fate should send a powerful message to the account
ing industry that proportionate liability will not save an auditor from collapse, particularly in
cases that involve large investor losses and potential criminal conduct.
64. The most significant of these was the Commission's power to bring actions against
aiders and abettors. See Exchange Act § 20, added by § 104 of the 1995 Act. The Supreme
Court a few years earlier had held that private plaintiffs could not sue aiders and abettors
under§ lO(b) of the Exchange Act. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511
U.S. 164 (1994).
65. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (stating that before enactment of the
1995 Act, Congress heard testimony concerning various abuses by the plaintiff's bar).

May 2003)

Standing Up to Wall Street (and Congress)

1527

ground. Even the President's veto message, which emphasized his
objections to the Act's mandatory Rule 11 provisions,66 showed where
his loyalties lay, giving the Act's proponents yet another argument for
an override.67 Little was done to compensate for the potential decrease
in private enforcement by broadening Commission powers, and
nothing was done to adequately fund the Commission's enforcement
budget.
In 1 998, plaintiffs lost another battle, this time over preemption of
class actions for securities fraud under state law. Congress had specifi
cally preserved state private rights of action when it enacted the
Exchange Act in 1934.68 Moreover, Congress did not create express
private rights of action for securities fraud that it might have created
had it chosen instead to preempt state law. Federal courts subse
quently implied a private right of action under section lO(b) of the
Exchange Act, but the Supreme Court has been hostile to it.69 The one
check on excessively pro-defendant federal case law under section
lO(b ), or on further statutory restrictions on plaintiffs similar to those
in the 1995 Act, was availability of class actions in state courts under
state law.
Defendants argued, however, that plaintiffs' lawyers were using
state litigation as an end-run around the · 1995 Act.70 Among other
abuses, state litigation was purportedly being used to obtain discovery
that was stayed pending resolution of a defendants' motion to dismiss
66. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 - Veto Message from the
President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 104-150 (1995) (stating that "Specifically, I
object to the following elements of this bill . . . Third, restore the Rule 1 1 language to that of
the Senate bill."), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. H l5,214-06 (1995). FRCP Rule 1 1 , among
other things, allows sanctions against lawyers for frivolous pleadings. The 1995 Act makes
these sanctions mandatory in securities cases. See Securities Act § 27 and Exchange Act §
210.
67. On December 20, 1995, the House voted to override the veto by a vote of 319-1 00,
and on December 22 the Senate voted to override the veto by a vote of 68-30. 141 CONG.
REC. H15,223 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S19180 (1995).
68. See § 16 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1996) ("The rights and remedies pro
vided by this Act shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist
at law or in equity.");§ 28(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1996) ("The rights
and reinedies provided by this title shall be in addition to any and all other rights and reme
dies that may exist at law or in equity.").
69. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) ("[W)e are satisfied that
Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy
for all fraud."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738, n:9 (1975) (stat
ing that the Court's seemingly arbitrary restriction on lawsuits under § lO(b) of the Ex
change Act by plaintiffs who did not buy or sell the securities in question is "attenuated to
the extent that remedies are available to nonpurchasers and nonsellers under state law").
70. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 57; Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism:
Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Cmises of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 302-14
( 1 998) (reciting statistics showing an increase in state court filings after the PSLRA); see also
144 CONG. REC. S4781 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (floor debate on. S. 1260) (statement of Sen.
Alfonse D'Amato) ("The problem to which I refer is .a loophole that strike lawyers have
found in the 1995 [Reform Act) . . . . ).
"
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under the 1995 Act.71 Congress could have enacted legislation nar
rowly targeting actual abuses (for example, allowing a federal court to
stay discovery in state proceedings), but instead used the sledge
hammer of preemption, forcing almost all class actions involving
misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of nation
ally traded securities into federal court.72 It did not matter that there
were only thirty-nine state class action suits in 1997,73 and that three
quarters of these were brought by California investors in California
courts against California defendants (many in the Silicon Valley).74 It
did not matter that this "problem," if there was one, may have been
more appropriately resolved in Sacramento than in Washington, and
that many of the politicians supporting preemption were generally
states' rights advocates. What mattered was that Silicon Valley wanted
this legislation and wanted it badly.75 While plaintiffs' lawyers put up a
fight, they were not fighting for something that was particularly impor
tant to them, because there was so little state-court litigation to begin
with. The bill quickly won broad bipartisan support in Congress,76 and
this time the signature of the President.
Once again, the Commission put up a half-hearted fight to
preserve private rights of action.77 Levitt (who does not mention this
controversy in his book) was up for reconfirmation at the time, putting
him in a difficult position. Congressional opponents of preemption
also were perceived to be in the pocket of plaintiffs' lawyers,
strengthening arguments that reform was needed because lawyers
were profiting at the expense of issuers and investors.

71. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 57, at 337 (discussing studies showing that state
court actions were filed primarily to evade the 1995 Act's stay of discovery and its higher
pleading standards).
72. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1 998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (amending I S U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb).
73. See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 102 (1998) (hereinafter Painter,
Responding to a False Alarm] (citing statistics prepared by Price Waterhouse).
74. See id. at 36 n.183 (citing Commission staff report that reviewed fifty-five complaints
filed in securities class actions under state law since passage of the 1995 Act and found that
forty-three of these cases (78 % ) had been filed in California).
75. See id. at S (discussing political contributions and lobbying power of Silicon Valley
issuers and venture capitalists).
76. See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1998). The Senate passed S.
1260 by a vote of 79 to 21 on May 1 3, 1 998, and the House passed H.R. 1689, as amended to
conform to S. 1260, by a vote of 340 to 83 on July 22, 1 998. See 144 CONG. REC. H6119-20
(daily ed. July 22, 1998).
77. See Painter, Responding to a False Alarm, supra note 73, at 53-54 (describing initial
Commission opposition to the Uniform Standards Act followed by endorsement of the Act
in return for minor adjustments to the Act and Senate floor discussion intended to create
retroactive legislative history clarifying the 1995 Act's treatment of the scienter standard for
suits under§ lO(b) of the Exchange Act).
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Ironically, the 1995 and 1998 Acts have not harmed the plaintiffs'
lawyers who led the fight against them. The market share of the most
prominent plaintiffs' firm increased substantially after 1995, probably
because the new legal rules raised barriers to entry into securities
plaintiffs' litigation.78 Securities fraud suits have also been filed in
record numbers after the 1995 Act.79 Lawyers thus still thrive in the
securities class action litigation system. It is more debatable, however,
whether civil litigation remains as powerful a deterrent to fraud as it
once was.
TAKING ON CONGRESS
The most consequential "pay to play" game in the 1 990s was that
of the special interests frustrating Levitt's regulatory agenda. Cam
paign contributions by all sides - accountants, high-technology firms,
the financial services industry and the plaintiffs' bar - meant that the
Commission, if it sought to infringe on special interests, always had to
fear that it would be overruled by Congress.
The most powerful theme in Levitt's book is his struggle with a
political system that gave regulated industries extraordinary influence
in Congress. The Commission's independence was undermined by its
constant need to go to Congress for funding, the threat of Congress
preempting the Commission's rulemaking function, and Levitt's own
quest for a second term, which required Senate confirmation. The
Commission was hardly an "independent" agency, immune from
pressure from either political branch of government.
The White House could have been a useful counterweight to the
Congressional pressure described by Levitt, but it usually was not. The
President did at least once tell Levitt's congressional critics to back
off,80 but with little effect. Before Enron, Worldcom, and similar
scandals broke in 2002, the relatively few battles that "pro-investor"
politicians waged were over class action litigation, which concerned
the interests of plaintiffs' lawyers as much as investors themselves.
This hypocrisy was not lost on defendant groups who alleged that
anyone who stood in their way was in the pocket of plaintiffs' lawyers.

78.

DONNA NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND

434 (2003) (citing statistical evidence showing that a single law firm, Milberg
Weiss, increased its share of securities class actions filed from 31 % before the 1995 Act to
59% after the Act).
MATERIALS

79. Id. at 428-29 (citing statistics from Stanford/Cornerstone Research showing 188 se
curities class actions filed in federal court in 1 995, 109 in 1996, 174 in 1997, 233 in 1998, and
then 259 in 2002).
80. See p. 306 (reprinting a September 29, 2000 letter from Senator Tom Daschle to
the President objecting to legislative initiatives to curb SEC oversight of the accounting
industry). "The White House later issued a statement saying that it strongly opposed
Congressional interference with the SEC's rulemaking." P. 306.
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Direct public appeal to investor protection as a goal in itself was not a
political priority.
For Levitt to point out the degree that the political process had
been corrupted might have cost him his reappointment in 1998, and he
did not do so (even Levitt's book lacks an Appendix B listing the
campaign contributions that accounting firms made to the authors of
the letters included in Appendix A). On the other hand, a vigorous
challenge to the role of campaign contributions in shaping securities
laws might have forced Levitt's critics in Congress to back down. They
might have retreated if Levitt had publicly explained why he believed
they were behaving the way they were.
Reform of the campaign-finance system, to the extent constitu
tionally permitted,81 is one remedy for the regulatory capture strate
gies that frustrated Levitt. Other less controversial measures, however,
could also guard the Commission from capture through Congressional
interference. First, the Commission's budget should be fixed over a
long period of time (with periodic increases tied to inflation and the
level of enforcement activity). Commission staff members' pay thus
would not depend upon the whim of legislators who may be displeased
at enforcement or rulemaking decisions.82 Second, the Chairman
should perhaps be limited to a single, but longer, term to prevent
reconfirmation from being implicitly conditioned on appeasement of
special interests in Congress. Finally, the Commission should make
public (perhaps on its web-site) all communications it receives from
Members of Congress or their staff concerning rule making and
enforcement activities. If the letters published in Appendix A to
Levitt's book had been available to newspapers at the time they were
written, such disclosure might have facilitated Levitt's case against
congressional interference.
CONCLUSION
Levitt's book omits some important issues. It virtually ignores the
debate over Congress's weakening of civil litigation as a deterrent for
securities fraud in the 1990s. It also does not refute the possibility
that the Commission spent political capital on some issues, such as
Regulation FD, that were tangential to the core problems in the 1990s:
misinformation, investor overoptimism, and overvaluation in the stock
market.83 Levitt also owes his readers a better explanation of why
important gatekeepers, such as analysts and lawyers, were not pursued
81. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 123

S.

Ct. 2071 (2003).

82. Federal judges for example, are constitutionally protected with lifetime tenure and
no reduction in salary. Commissioners and their staff, by contrast, have relatively little pro
tection and commensurately less independence from Congress.
83. See generally ROBERT SHILLER,

I R RATIONAL EXUBERANCE

(2000).
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by the Commission with the same vigor that was devoted, with mixed
results, to accountants.
Levitt's practical advice for investors is helpful. He does not,
however, adequately explain why small investors should invest in indi
vidual stocks at all, rather than in diversified funds whose managers
can overcome at least some disadvantages the market imposes on
unsophisticated investors.84 Even if all of Levitt's recommendations for
reform were implemented and all investors followed his advice, level
ing the playing field between individual investors and sophisticated
market participants may still be a losing proposition. To the extent this
book encourages individual investors to engage in stock picking, in
effect to try to outguess the market, Levitt's advice may not be
sound.85
Nonetheless, this book is an exceptionally interesting account of
Levitt's fight against special interests that sought to derail his agenda
as Chairman of the Commission. Levitt tells investors how severe their
collective-action problems are in a political system in which everybody
else can coordinate. He powerfully indicts a political system in which
he stood virtually alone as a voice for the investing public. Voters, as
well as investors, would profit from listening to what he has to say.

84. Levitt does, however, discuss the perils of investing in poorly managed mutual funds,
or funds with excessive or undisclosed fees. See pp. 41-64 (Chapter Two, "The Seven Deadly
Sins of Mutual Funds"). Nonetheless, he did not foresee the seriousness of the conduct illegal late trading and market timing transactions that while legal should be disclosed that would scandalize the mutual fund industry in 2003. See Stephen Laba ton, S. E. C. 's Over
sight of Mutual Funds Is Said to Be Lax, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, at Al. (" I believe this is
the worst scandal we've seen in 50 years, and I can't say I saw it coming" (quoting Arthur
Levitt (internal quotation marks omitted))).
85. One study examined 1 10,000 individual accounts at a national discount brokerage
firm and found that between 1990 and 1996, 20% of investors who bought at least 25 stocks
demonstrated stock picking ability by choosing stocks that on average performed signifi
cantly better than market averages (adjusted for the risk level in the investment). These in
vestors picked stocks that on average gained 44% per year compared with 14.5 % for the
Wilshire 5000 index. Seventy percent of the investors, however, did worse than the market
averages when transaction costs were included. See JOSHUA D. COVAL ET AL., CAN
INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS BEAT THE MARKET? (Harvard Business School, Negotiation,
Organizations, and Markets Unit, Working Paper 02-45, 2002), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=364000.

